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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Martha Elena Chavez-Chilel petitions for review of a 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 
her applications for asylum and withholding of removal.  
Because (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) 
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failure to include the date and time of her hearing in its Notice 
to Appear (“NTA”) does not require termination of her 
immigration proceedings, and (2) substantial evidence 
supported the BIA’s conclusion that “Guatemalan women” is 
not a particular social group (“PSG”) for asylum or 




Chavez-Chilel, a native and citizen of Guatemala, 
entered the United States without admission or parole.  DHS 
issued her an NTA before an IJ, “on a date to be set at a time 
to be set,” charging her with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  A.R. 444–45.  She was subsequently 
served a Notice of Hearing that specified the date and time to 
appear.   
 
 Before the IJ, Chavez-Chilel admitted the factual 
allegations in the NTA and conceded removability as charged.  
She then filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and protection under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”).  With respect to her claims for asylum and 
withholding of removal, she asserted that she would be subject 
to persecution because she is a member of a PSG:  
“Guatemalan women.”  A.R. 202.   
 
Chavez-Chilel moved to terminate her removal 
proceedings, arguing that the NTA was defective under Pereira 
v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2114–15 (2018).  The IJ denied 
the motion, reasoning that (1) Pereira concerned only 
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cancellation of removal and its stop-time rule,1 not asylum or 
withholding of removal, (2) Chavez-Chilel suffered no 
prejudice from any deficiency in the NTA, and (3) a deficient 
NTA does not divest the IJ of jurisdiction.   
 
At her merits hearing, Chavez-Chilel testified that she 
was raped as a teenager in Guatemala, the police did not take 
any action when she reported this crime, and the same man 
later threatened to rape her again.  She explained that she feared 
she would be sexually assaulted or killed if she was removed 
to Guatemala.  The IJ denied Chavez-Chilel’s applications for 
asylum and withholding of removal,2 finding that, while she 
was credible and that her rape qualified as past persecution, her 
proposed PSG, “Guatemalan women,” did not constitute a PSG 
for asylum or withholding of removal purposes.  The IJ 
concluded that this PSG was not “sufficiently particular” 
because there was no evidence that Guatemalan women share 
a “unifying characteristic” or present a “unified target” for 
persecution.  A.R. 98.  Chavez-Chilel appealed to the BIA.  
  
The BIA dismissed the appeal and affirmed, reasoning 
that: (1) the NTA and subsequent Notice of Hearing vested the 
IJ with jurisdiction, so terminating and re-initiating the 
 
1 The stop-time rule, relevant only to applications for 
cancellation of removal, provides that a noncitizen’s “period of 
continuous physical presence is ‘deemed to end . . . when the 
[noncitizen] is served a[n NTA] under section 1229(a).’”  
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1)(A)). 
2 However, the IJ granted Chavez-Chilel’s application 
for CAT protection.  The Government did not appeal this 
decision to the BIA.   
5 
 
removal proceedings was not warranted, and (2) Chavez-
Chilel’s proposed PSG was “too broad to be cognizable.”  A.R. 
4.    
 






 The BIA and IJ properly denied Chavez-Chilel’s motion 
to terminate removal proceedings even though her NTA lacked 
a specific date and time to appear.  Title 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) 
requires that an NTA include, among other things, the “time 
and place at which the proceedings will be held.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).  Chavez-Chilel argues that DHS’s failure 
to comply with § 1229(a) constitutes a statutory violation, 
which itself requires terminating the proceedings.    This 
argument fails for several reasons.   
 
First, while § 1229(a) sets forth the type of notice that 
must be given to a noncitizen and requires an NTA to include 
a date and time to appear, the absence of that information does 
 
3 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction over final orders of 
the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 
665 F.3d 496, 502 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).  We review legal 
determinations de novo and “accept factual findings if 
supported by substantial evidence,” meaning we must “uphold 
the agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel 
any reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.”  Sesay v. 
Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 
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not impact the IJ’s authority to act.  See Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 
930 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2019); see also United States v. 
Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 364 (4th Cir. 2019) (observing that the 
information that must be provided to a noncitizen under § 1229 
differs from what must be provided to an IJ for it to act).  An 
IJ can act when a charging document, such as an NTA, is filed.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings 
before an [IJ] commence, when a charging document is filed 
with the Immigration Court by [DHS].”).  Thus, 
noncompliance with the language of § 1229 alone does not 
require an IJ to terminate the proceedings. 
 
Second, even if Chavez-Chilel’s NTA did not comport 
with the “letter” of § 1229, that statute is akin to a claims-
processing rule.  Perez-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 
1153–57 (11th Cir. 2019).  Claims-processing rules “seek to 
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the 
parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”  
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 
(2011).  They differ from jurisdictional rules, which “govern[] 
a court’s adjudicatory capacity,” namely “its subject-matter or 
personal jurisdiction.”  Id.  Said differently, jurisdictional rules 
typically act as “external constraints” on an entity, whereas 
claims-processing rules are “internal rules” that help to 
maintain order but do not “define the scope of [the entity’s] 
power.”  Cortez, 930 F.3d at 360–61 (citations omitted).4  
 
4 Chavez-Chilel asserts that § 1003.18(b) contradicts 
§ 1229 and is thus arguably claiming that the regulation is 
entitled to no Chevron deference.  There are no Circuit rulings 
currently holding that the regulation violates Chevron, see, 





rehearing granted on separate grounds, 948 F.3d 989 (2020), 
but at least one has viewed the Attorney General as “exercising 
congressionally delegated authority” when he “promulgated 
regulations governing the initiation of removal proceedings.”  
Cortez, 930 F.3d at 358 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2)).   We do 
not need to address this argument because Chavez-Chilel’s 
petition is based upon her view that a violation of the statue 
alone entitles her to relief.  We nonetheless note that the 
relevant regulations further the processing of a claim.  For 
example, the Attorney General has issued regulations setting 
forth the requirements for charging documents, such as NTAs.  
For instance, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 provides that a charging 
document must include the nature of the proceedings, the legal 
authority under which the proceedings are being conducted, the 
acts alleged to violate the law, the statutes allegedly violated, 
the fact that the noncitizen may have counsel appear on her 
behalf, the address of the IJ where the NTA is to be filed, and 
notice to the noncitizen concerning in absentia removal.  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b); see also Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 
690 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating that “proceedings before an [IJ] 
commence when a charging document is filed.  To constitute a 
valid charging document, the regulations require that a notice 
to appear list the nature of the proceedings, the legal authority 
for the proceedings, and the warning about the possibility of in 
absentia removal[.]”), abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1479–80 (2021)).  A 
different regulation provides that an NTA need only include 
the date and time of the initial hearing “where practicable.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b).  As there was no showing that 
providing a date and time in the NTA at the time it was issued 




Section 1229 is a claims-processing rule because it seeks to 
ensure that noncitizens appear for proceedings by requiring 
that the noncitizen be informed of the time and place of the 
hearing.  By providing that information, the agency can set a 
schedule for moving the case forward.  When there is a 
violation of a claims processing rule, as compared with a 
jurisdictional rule, the adjudicator has the authority to 
determine how to address the noncompliance.  Cf. Gutierrez v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The 
import of th[e] distinction between jurisdictional and [claims-
processing] rules . . . is that courts cannot create equitable 
exceptions to jurisdictional [rules].”).  Thus, because there can 
be equitable reasons to excuse noncompliance with a claims-
processing rule, see id. at 197–98 (explaining that where there 
is a violation of a “claims-processing rule . . . a court can 
exercise its discretion and hear an untimely appeal”), there is 
no automatic requirement that a violation of a claims-
processing rule results in the termination of a proceeding.5 
 
of the required components.  Thus, the NTA complied with the 
regulations.   
5 Several of our sister Circuits have described the 
regulations relevant here as claims-processing rules and some 
have viewed compliance with certain claims-processing rules 
as mandatory.  See Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 
1278–79 (10th Cir. 2020) (observing that a “claim-processing 
rule is mandatory to the extent a court must enforce the rule if 
a party properly raises it,” and suggesting no prejudice analysis 
is required); Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1153–57 (treating the 
statute and regulations as claim-processing rules but not 
addressing whether failure to comply with the statute required 




Third, even if the NTA’s omission of a date and place 
did not comply with the statute, the omission was harmless.  
“[H]armless error analysis . . . appl[ies] in immigration cases,” 
and an error is harmless “when it is highly probable that [it] did 
not affect the outcome of the case.”  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 
642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Guadalupe v. Att’y 
Gen., 951 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding error in 
petitioner’s NTA was not harmless); see also Matter of Rosales 
Vargas, 27 I. & N. Dec. 745, 753 (B.I.A. 2020) (“While the 
respondents in this case timely challenged the deficiencies in 
their [NTAs], there is no apparent prejudice.”).  The purpose 
of an NTA is to notify a noncitizen that she is removable and 
provide the basis for that allegation.  The NTA here provided 
such notice, and the subsequent Notice of Hearing provided the 
date and time of the hearing.  The lack of a date and time for a 
hearing on the NTA did not impede Chavez-Chilel’s 
opportunity to contest the charge against her, present evidence, 
and receive CAT relief.  Accordingly, DHS’s failure to include 
the date and time for her hearing on the NTA itself was 
 
before the BIA); Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 691–93 (noting that 
“[a] claim-processing rule is mandatory to the extent a court 
must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it,” but 
determining petitioner failed to timely raise his objection to the 
NTA); Cortez, 930 F.3d at 359–62; Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 
F.3d 956, 962–66 (7th Cir. 2019).  Given the purpose of the 
claims-processing rule before us, namely to ensure the 
proceedings move forward and that the noncitizen have an 
opportunity to participate, equitable considerations inform 
whether technical noncompliance requires particular relief. 
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harmless error, and thus a remand to direct the termination of 
the proceeding, or to re-initiate it, is unwarranted.6  
 
For all of these reasons, the violation of § 1229 did not 
require the IJ to terminate the proceedings.7 
 
6 To the extent Chavez-Chilel bases any of her 
arguments on Pereira, that case is inapposite because it governs 
only a specific aspect of cancellation of removal relief—the 
stop-time rule—and Chavez-Chilel is not seeking that type of 
relief.  See 138 S. Ct. at 2114–15; Nkomo, 930 F.3d at 133 
(explaining that Pereira “did not purport to resolve issues 
beyond the . . . stop-time rule context, and the Supreme Court 
repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of its holding”). 
7 None of the three cases Chavez-Chilel identified in her 
Rule 28(j) letters changes the result.  Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 
F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2021), addresses in absentia removal orders, 
which are not at issue here.  In any event, the in absentia 
provision specifically refers to § 1229(a), see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (explaining that an in absentia removal 
order may be rescinded “upon a motion to reopen filed at any 
time if the alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive 
notice in accordance with [§ 1229(a)]”), and thus “require[s] a 
single document containing the required information[, 
including the date and time of the hearing,] in the in absentia 
context,” 15 F.4th at 355.  By contrast, “the jurisdiction-vesting 
regulation[] d[oes] not cross-reference 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a).”  
Mejia Romero v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2021).  
Rodriguez does not, therefore, affect our conclusion that 
§ 1229(a) is not jurisdictional.  Thus, Rodriguez has no bearing 






De La Rosa v. Garland, 2 F.4th 685 (7th Cir. 2021), also 
does not change our analysis.  De La Rosa held that § 1229(a) 
is a mandatory claims-processing rule, and so “[a] noncitizen 
who raises a timely objection to a noncompliant [NTA] . . . is 
entitled to relief without also having to show prejudice from 
the defect.”  Id. at 688.  Even if we were to adopt De La Rosa, 
including its view that § 1229(a) is a mandatory claims-
processing rule, it would not provide Chavez-Chilel a basis for 
relief.  De La Rosa directs that an objection to the contents of 
an NTA should “be[] lodged at the outset of the proceeding.”  
Id.; see also Chen v. Barr, 960 F.3d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 2020) 
(observing that “[a] problem in the charging document could 
and should have been pointed out promptly, so that any error 
could be fixed.”).  According to De La Rosa, absent a timely 
objection, the petitioner must show “excusable untimeliness 
and . . . prejudice.”  2 F.4th 687–88.  Chavez-Chilel waited 
until just before her merits hearing to raise her complaint about 
the omissions on the NTA, over two years after her 
proceedings commenced, and did not raise her statutory 
argument until she appealed to the BIA.  Because her 
objections were not raised at the “outset of the proceeding,” 
they were untimely and, under De La Rosa, she is required to 
show prejudice.  As we have explained, she has failed to do so. 
That Chavez-Chilel filed her motion roughly one month 
after Pereira was decided is of no moment.  As previously 
mentioned, the ruling addresses the stop-time rule.  Moreover, 
to the extent it is being relied upon as a basis to challenge 
defects in NTAs, arguments concerning defective NTAs were 
plainly available before Pereira.  See, e.g., Mejia-Padilla v. 
Garland, 2 F.4th 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that 






The BIA also correctly concluded that Chavez-Chilel is 
not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal.  A removable 
noncitizen may be eligible for asylum if she demonstrates that 
she is “unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail [herself] . . . of the protection of, [the 
 
premised on Pereira could have been raised in 2012 in light of 
the “statute’s plain language”); Salazar-Marroquin v. Barr, 969 
F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Petitioner could have raised 
this argument earlier, relying on . . . the clear statutory text and 
the Third Circuit’s earlier disagreement with the effect of a 
noncompliant [NTA].” (quotation marks omitted)); Ortiz-
Santiago, 924 F.3d at 964 (explaining that a Pereira-based 
objection could have been lodged in the wake of Orozco-
Velasquez v. Attorney General, 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2016)).   
Finally, as to Matter of Arambula-Bravo, 28 I. & N. 
Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2021), Chavez-Chilel concedes it neither 
helps nor hurts her position and simply does “not foreclose” 
his contention that a “statutory violation is a distinct issue . . . 
from . . . a jurisdictional defect.”  ECF No. 27.  Indeed, in 
leaving “further consideration of [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)] as a 
claims-processing rule for another day,” Arambula-Bravo, 28 
I. & N. Dec. at 392 n.3, the BIA highlighted disagreement 
among Courts of Appeals, comparing De La Rosa with B.R. v. 
Garland, in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that “IJs . . . have authority to allow DHS to cure improper 
service of an NTA without requiring termination of 
proceedings,” 4 F.4th 783, 794 (9th Cir. 2021).  Arambula-
Bravo is, therefore, also of no assistance to Chavez-Chilel. 
 Thus, none of the cases identified in Chavez-Chilel’s 
Rule 28(j) letters alters our analysis. 
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country to which she would be removed] because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of . . . membership in a [PSG].”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 
see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 
Whether a petitioner’s proffered PSG is cognizable 
“presents a mixed question of law and fact, since the ultimate 
legal question of cognizability depends on underlying factual 
questions concerning the group and the society of which it is a 
part.”  S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 
2018).  Accordingly, we “review de novo the ultimate legal 
conclusion as to the existence of a [PSG]” but “review the 
underlying factual findings for substantial evidence.”  Id. 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s finding 
that “Guatemalan women” is not a cognizable PSG.  A PSG 
must be: “(1) composed of members who share a common 
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) 
socially distinct within the society in question.”  S.E.R.L., 894 
F.3d at 540 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Particularity “addresses the outer limits of a group’s 
boundaries and is definitional in nature, whereas social 
distinction focuses on whether the people of a given society 
would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate or 
distinct.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  To satisfy the 
particularity requirement, “an alleged social group [must] have 
discrete and . . . definable boundaries that are not amorphous, 
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective, so as to provide a clear 
standard for determining who is a member.”  Id. at 553 




Chavez-Chilel’s proposed PSG lacks particularity.  
“[N]ot every immutable characteristic is sufficiently precise to 
define a [PSG],” id. at 552, and courts have concluded that a 
proposed PSG of all women in a particular country “is 
overbroad[] because no factfinder could reasonably conclude 
that all [of a country’s] women had a well-founded fear of 
persecution based solely on their gender,” Safaie v. INS, 25 
F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (addressing Iranian women).8  
Reasons to depart from this general rule are not present here.  
For example, in Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 
2007), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized 
the PSG of all Somali women because “all Somali females 
have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on gender 
given the prevalence of” female genital mutilation.  Id. at 518; 
see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797–98 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (same); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 
(B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing PSG of “young women” in a 
particular tribe in Togo due to pervasive practice of female 
 
8 In Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668–69 (9th Cir. 
2010), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed 
with the BIA’s conclusion that “all women in Guatemala” was 
too broad a group to qualify as a PSG and remanded for further 
analysis.  That case rested on the Ninth Circuit’s two-part 
definition of a PSG, which recognized any group “united by a 
voluntary association, including a former association, or by an 
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or 
consciences of its members that members either cannot or 
should not be required to change it.”  Id. at 666 (quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted).  This definition is not consistent 
with our Court’s three requirements for a PSG, see S.E.R.L., 
894 F.3d at 540, so we decline to follow the reasoning in 
Perdomo.   
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genital mutilation).  Here, by contrast, there is no record 
evidence that all Guatemalan women share a unifying 
characteristic that results in them being targeted for any form 
of persecution based solely on their gender.  Cf. A.R. 170–73, 
182 (Chavez-Chilel’s testimony that she knew of no other 
women who suffered sexual or domestic violence); A.R. 232 
(report explaining that one-third more Guatemalan women 
experience sexual or domestic violence against them than 
women in Paraguay).   Accordingly, while the size of the group 
standing alone would not disqualify a group from being a PSG, 
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013), Chavez-
Chilel has failed to demonstrate that her proposed PSG is 
sufficiently particularized.  Thus, her alleged fear of 
persecution based upon membership in such a group does not 
provide a basis for asylum.  Because Chavez-Chilel cannot 
prove her asylum claim, she cannot meet the higher standard 
to obtain withholding of removal.  See Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 
967 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2020).  As a result, the IJ and BIA 
correctly denied her request for asylum and withholding of 
removal.9 
 
9 We will also deny Chavez-Chilel’s motion for remand 
to apply for voluntary departure.  An application for voluntary 
departure must be made prior to or at the conclusion of removal 
proceedings.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)-(c).  Chavez-Chilel 
failed to so apply before the IJ’s order became final.  
Accordingly, to seek voluntary departure, Chavez-Chilel must 
file a motion to reopen with the BIA, not a motion to remand 
in this Court.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to 
reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an 
application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate 






 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[After the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act], the executive branch, not the judiciary, is 
given the sole authority to determine when an alien must 
depart.”).   
